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The Political Control of Bureaucracies under 
Asymmetric Information* 
Jeffrey S. Banlcs, Department of Political Science and Department of 
Economics, University of Rochester 
Barry R. Weingast, Hoover Institution, Stanford University 
We analyze a model of interest group influence where this influence arises from a group's ability 
to provide relevant information to political actors about regulatory performance. The model rests on 
three premises: (I) bureaucrats possess an informational advantage, vis-~-vis their political overseers, 
concerning policy relevant variables; (2) this informational advantage is potentially exploitable by the 
agency; and (3) politicians anticipate this exploitation and adapt to it in their design of agencies. We 
show that a major consequence of this anticipation and adaptation is service to organized interest 
groups. 
The relationship between interest groups and policy choice has long been of 
interest to scholars of regulation, and they play a central role in a variety of 
theories. These include the "capture" hypothesis of Bernstein (1955) and Hun-
tington (1952), the "cartel by design" hypothesis of Kolko (1965) and Stigler 
(1971), the famous fourfold table of Wilson (1974), and, more recently, theories 
in which political actors bias policy decisions in favor of their constituents (e.g., 
Fiorina 1981; Moe 1989; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989). 1 While the spe-
cific pattern of interest group influence differs considerably across these theories, 
the mechanics of interest group influence typically fall into two categories. One 
approach focuses on the electoral role of interest groups and their ability to mo-
bilize resources and votes (most notably Stigler 1971; Peltzman 1976). A second 
approach focuses on the role of interest groups as sources of information for both 
bureaucrats and politicians (see such disparate models as Fiorina 1981; Mc-
Cubbins and Schwartz 1984; Moe 1989; Wilson 1980). While Stigler and Peltz-
man have formalized the former approach, no one has formalized the latter. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a model of interest group influence, 
distinct from their electoral effects, based on their ability to provide information 
to political actors about regulatory performance. The model rests on three prem-
ises. First, bureaucrats are experts in their policy areas and have substantial in-
formational advantages with respect to their political overseers. Second, this in-
formational advantage is potentially exploitable by the agency. Third, politicians 
*The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the National Science Foundation 
under grants SES 87-00468 and SES 86-17516, respectively. We also thank Paul Rubin and Jon 
Bendor for detailed and valuable comments on an earlier draft. 
1 Noll ( 1988) provides an excellent review of these literatures. 
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510 Jeffrey S. Banks and Barry R. Weingast 
anticipate this problem and adapt to it. We show that a major consequence of this 
anticipation and adaptation is service to organized groups. 
Building on the model in Banks (1989), we begin with a situation like that 
studied by Niskanen (1971): a politician desires some service to be provided by 
an agency. Both the politician and the agency know the politician's value of the 
service, but only the agency knows the cost of providing the service. In the Nis-
kanen model, this allows the agency to present the sponsor with a take-it-or-
leave-it offer to produce the service in return for a budget named by the agency. 
Since the politician will accept any request as long as it is less than or equal to 
his reservation budget, a budget-maximizing agency will request this level, 
thereby receiving all of the available gains from the transaction. Moreover, as 
Niskanen shows, this holds regardless of the true cost of the service, provided 
the politician can not learn the true cost. 
While the Niskanen (1971) model focuses on one of the key problems of the 
bureaucracy, it is unlikely to give a good characterization of bureaucratic politics 
because it ignores the ability of politicians to adapt to it. A range of scholars in 
the "politic;al control" tradition have emphasized this point (e.g., Bendor, Taylor, 
and Van Gaalen 1985; Fiorina 1981; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; Mc-
Cubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989; Miller and Moe 1983; Moe 1989; Weingast 
1984). According to Fiorina (1981, 333), "The bureaucracy is not out of control 
because Congress controls the bureaucracy and Congress gives us the kind of 
bureaucracy it wants." Similarly, Bendor, Taylor, and Van Gaalen (1985) note 
that since politicians can make themselves better off by shifting some resources 
to monitoring bureaus that are absorbing revenues in ways that do not benefit 
powerful constituencies, it is unlikely that an enduring pattern of budgetary ex-
pansion is due to bureaucratic "hoodwinking" of the public. 
The interaction between the politicians and the agency becomes more inter-
esting when we allow the former to investigate or "audit" the latter's produc-
tion process, where such an action reveals to the politicians the true cost of the 
agency's service; the politicians can subsequently set the budget equal to this 
cost. However, if auditing is costly to the politician it will not always be optimal 
to adopt this strategy. Under these circumstances, then, the agency cannot extract 
all of the possible gains, but still extracts some of them. 2 
In what follows, we utilize the Banks (1989) model to derive an important . 
comparative statics result: the higher the costs of auditing, the greater the amount 
the agency can extract. This provides the link with the literature that focuses on 
the role of a politician's constituency in mitigating an agency's informational 
advantage (notably McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). Typically, organized con-
2Bendor, Taylor, and Van Gaalen (1985, 1987) also explore models in which the politician can 
audit the agency; however, theirs is set up in "principal-agent" framework, in contrast to the "sequen-
tially rational" framework adopted here. See Banks (1989) for a fuller discussion of the differences 
between their model and ours. 
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stituents have access to expertise and information that can rival that of an agency. 
If the agency is designed to serve the constituents' interests, then it will be in the 
latter's interest to provide the information to their representatives so that the pol-
iticians can use it to limit agency exploitation. In this way, constituents subsidize 
the costs to the politicians of learning an agency's true costs. 
This formulation . yields surprising results for the question of bureaucratic 
control. To see this, we follow Fiorina (1985) and McCubbins (1985) and ask, 
How do politicians decide which agencies to create? The comparative statics 
result noted above suggests one answer. While all agencies have the same poten-
tial for asymmetric information, each faces a different interest group with a dif-
ferent level of access to the information held by the agency. From the politician's 
standpoint, this means that agencies may be created with virtually no ability to 
exploit their position, namely, those where the relevant constituents have a low 
cost of access to information. Because these agencies are unable to exploit their 
information, politicians and their constituents capture most of the available rents. 
A second major difference among potential agencies concerns the extent of these 
available rents. Clearly, not all agencies are equally desirable for politicians, 
since agencies have varying abilities to serve constituencies and generate votes. 
When selecting or creating a single agency, therefore, a politician will consider 
an agency's value vis-a-vis alternative agencies as well. Thus, depending on the 
characteristics of the potential agencies, the politician's selection of an "optimal" 
agency will involve a trade-off between the value an agency generates and the 
ability of the politician to secure that value through limitations on the agency's 
informational advantage. 
The model yields three important results. First, while an informational ad-
vantage potentially allows an agency to extract large amounts of the gains from 
politicians, agencies are likely to be created only in those areas where the advan-
tage is minimal relative to their political value. Even though potential asymme-
tries are important and play a large role in the selection of agency creation, those 
agencies that actually are created suffer from this problem only to a limited de-
gree (or possess a political value far outweighing any such problems). 
The second implication of the approach is derived from the first and con-
cerns the efficiency consequences of bureaucracy. Previous approaches have fo-
cused on inefficiencies that arise because bureaucracies provide too many ser-
vices, or because a given service is provided at too high a price (Niskanen 1971). 
In contrast, our model has inefficiencies that arise through the selection process 
itself. Namely, there may exist potential agencies that are not created because 
politicians have no means of preventing the agency from extracting a dispropor-
tionate share of the rents. The politician therefore might prefer a less valuable 
agency with lower auditing costs, since the net return from this agency is greater. 
Returning to ·the role of interest groups in regulation, a final conclusion of 
the model is that, even if organized constituencies possess limited electoral ad-
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vantages, agencies should be observed to serve them because politicians are 
biased in favor of creating agencies to serve them. The source of bias character-
ized in this paper arises not because of the differential electoral rewards but be-
cause interest groups play an active role in the production and monitoring process 
by providing politicians with a source of information independent of the agency. 
Put simply, agencies designed to serve unorganized groups allow bureaucrats to 
extract too much of the gains from policymaking at the expense of both politi-
cians and their constituents, and hence politicians fail to create them because 
they are not worth the costs. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 details the basic model of infor-
mation asymmetry between politicians and agencies, showing how an agency 
potentially may extract gains from its political overseers as a function of the cost 
of auditing and the value of the agency. Section 2 describes the politicians' pref-
erences over agencies, where these preferences are induced by the equilibrium 
behavior of the parties in the basic model of section 1 and considers the selection 
of an optimal agency. Section 3 then turns to the role of interest groups in relation 
to auditing costs, agency value, and the characteristics of the set of potential 
feasible agencies, and discusses the efficiency consequences of the model. Our 
conclusions follow. 
1. A Model of the Politician-Agency Relationship 
In this section, we consider the model due to Banks (1989) of the interaction 
between a politician, P, and an agency, A, where A provides costly services which 
are valued by P, and where P is the sole source of funding for these services. The 
value of the agency's services to Pis denoted by v, v > 0, while the cost of the 
services is c, c ~ 0. The parameter v is known to both parties, while initially 
only the agency is aware of c; thus, ex ante P treats c as a random variable 
with positive density ft·) on R + . The players P and A interact to determine the 
agency's budget, b A, in the following manner: A makes a budget request b E R + , 
after which P can either accept the request and set bA = b, reject the request and 
thereby forgo the agency's services, or audit the agency at a cost of k > 0. Fol-
lowing an audit, the true value of the agency's cost c is revealed to P, so that P 
will set the budget at bA = c and acquire the agency's services if c ~ v, and forgo 
the services if c > v. 3 Since the agency can make the budget request contingent 
on the true value of c, a budget strategy for A is a function 
where ~(c) is the budget requested by the agency if the true cost is c. After 
observing the agency's request, the politician makes the audit/accept/reject deci-
3In principle, P could set any budget following an audit; however, in any sequential equilibrium 
P's response will be as specified. 
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sion, where we allow P to randomize in this decision. Thus, an audit strategy for 
P is a function 
a: R+ -+ [O, 1)2, 
where a(b) = (a1(b), a 2(b)), and a 1(b) is the probability that P accepts a request 
of b, a 2(b) is the probability that P audits, and 1 - a 1(b) - a 2(b) is the proba-
bility that P rejects. 
We assume that both parties are risk-neutral, with A interested in maximiz-
ing the expected budget surplus, and P maximizing the value of the agency net 
of the budget as well as any audit costs.4 Thus, the expected utility for A from 
requesting a budget of b, given true cost c and auditing strategy a by P. is 
EUA(b, c; a) = a 1(b)(b - c). 
Similarly, the expected utility for P from accepting a budget request b with prob-
ability a1 and auditing with probability a2, given posterior beliefs µ.concerning 
the value of c, is 
EUp(b, a; µ.) = a1(v - b) + a2[v - c.,. - k], 
where c.,. = f cµ.(c I b)dc. 
We analyze this situation by examining a subset of the set of sequential 
equilibrium strategies for the players (Kreps and Wilson 1982). 5 A sequential 
equilibrium consists of strategies ~·, a*, and beliefs µ. *, such that (i) for all c E 
R + ~*(c) maximizes EUA(b, c, a*); (ii) for all b ER+, a*(b) maximizes EUp(b, 
a, µ.*);and (iii) if ~•- 1(b) * <I>, then µ.*(b) satisfies Bayes's rule according to 
the budget strategy~· and the priorj(·). 
To solve for the equilibria, we identify a critical value of auditing costs. Let 
k' solve 
f cj(c)dc I f j(c)dc = v - k, (1) 
so that if k = k', P is indifferent between accepting and auditing a budget of v 
requested by all c E [O, v] . The following two results characterize the player's 
equilibrium behavior fork~ k' and fork< k', and are proven in Banks (1989) .6 
'As Banks (1989) notes, the equilibrium behavior of P andA is unchanged if A were interested 
in maximizing the budget, rather than the budget surplus, subject to the constraint that the budget be 
at least as great as the cost of production. Funher, Banks (1989) shows that assuming P and A are 
risk-averse, rather than risk-neutral, does not qualitatively effect the results either. 
'Propositions I and 2 below characterize those sequential equilibria that are universally divine 
(Banks and Sobel 1987). 
'Clearly, by the description of the agency's preferences, we can ignore the behavior of cost 
types c > v in the determination of equilibrium strategies, since these types will never request a budget 
less than v if such a request is accepted with positive probability. However, the presence of such types 
will be important for the comparative statics results to follow, since as the value of the agency, v, 
increases more cost types will subsequently be able to transact with P at a positive budget surplus. 
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PROPOSITION 1: If k ~ k', then the following constitute sequential equilib-
rium strategies: 
~*(c) = v, 'tic E [0, v] 
a 1(b) = 1, 'ti b ~ v. 
Thus, if the cost of auditing an agency is sufficiently high, the agency requests a 
budget equal to v, and the politician accepts it with probability one. In these 
cases, it is simply not worth the auditing costs for the politician to determine the 
agency's real costs and set its budget at this level. 
To solve the case where k < k', we define c' as the cost that solves the 
following: 
G(c, k, v) = [f cf(c)dc I f /(c)dc ] - v + k = 0. (2) 
This says that if A sets ~(c) = y if and only if c E [c', v], then P will be indiffer-
ent between accepting and auditing upon observing a budget request of b = v. 
PROPOSITION 2: If k < k', then the following constitute sequential equilib-
rium strategies: 
~*(c) {c + k if c E [O, c') 
= v if c E [c', v], 
{
1 ifb~k 
exp{(k - b)lk} if b E [k, c' + k], 
0 if b E (c' + k, v) 
exp{c' lk}kl(v - c') if b = v 
af(b) 
at(b) = 1 - af(b). 
Thus, if c ~ c' the agency sets its budget request equal to its true cost of produc-
tion plus the costs of auditing, b = c + k. For b E [k, c' + k], then, Pis able 
to invert A's budget strategy and hence is aware of the true cost when making the 
auditing decision. The requested budget is such that P is indifferent between 
accepting and auditing, implying that adopting the equilibrium mixed strategy is 
optimal. Further, the auditing schedule is chosen to give the agency with cost c 
~ c' the incentive to reveal this information. In particular, higher budget requests 
are audited more often, thereby giving the agency the incentive to request b = c 
+ k rather than some higher amount. Cost types c E (c', v] pool at the request b 
= v, implying that P is able to make only a limited inference concerning the 
value of c. The politician audits the request b = v more often than any other 
(equilibrium) request, again providing the incentive for the agency to adopt the 
budget strategy, ~*. This is illustrated in Figure 1. 
The above propositions describe the equilibrium behavior of the politician 
and the agency as a function of the auditing cost k, value of the agency v, the 
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prior probability/(·), and true agency cost c. If k < k', the ability of the agency 
to extract large budgets through its control of the budgetary agenda is mitigated 
by the possibility that the politician will incur a cost and subsequently eliminate 
any informational asymmetry, and hence any budget surplus. If on the other hand 
k ~ k', then such a possibility will not occur in equilibrium, thus allowing the 
agency to "monopoly price" its services to the politician. 
2. Agency Selection 
The model and the subsequent equilibrium behavior derived in the previous 
section form the basis for the politicians' selection of an "optimal" agency, since 
now we can describe the politician's preferences over the set of potential agen-
cies. From an ex ante perspective, we can view an agency as being characterized 
by an auditing cost k, an agency value v, and a prior probability distribution/(·). 
In what follows, we focus attention on k and v, since (as we shall argue) these 
variables are directly related to the role of interest groups. 
From Propositions 1 and 2 above we see that if the pair (k, v) is such that k 
~ k', then the politician receives a zero net return from the agency, while if (k, 
v) is such that k < k', then the politician receives a positive net return from the 
agency, since for low agency costs the budget will be equal to either c (if audited) 
or some value between c and v (if accepted). Further, the magnitude of this return 
will be a function of both the auditing cost k and the value of the agency v. Let 
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U(k, v) denote the ex ante expected utility of P generated by the equilibrium 
behavior described in the above propositions. Then, 
U(k, v) = {~g'(v - c - k)f(c)dc if k < k' 
if k ;:;i.: k'' (3) 
where c' is a function of both k and v, and k' is a function of v. Given that the 
politician will be selecting an agency to maximize U(k, v), we can safely ignore 
those agencies where k ;:;io: k' , since as long as one agency exists such that k < k' 
the politician would never choose an agency where k ;:;io: k'. 
To derive the politician's preferences over potential agencies we first exam-
ine the effect of changes in the underlying parameters (k, v) on the ex ante ex-
pected utility generated by the agency, U(k, v). This yields the following result. 
PROPOSITION 3: If k < k'' then CJU/CJk < 0. 
PROOF: Differentiating U(k, v) with respect to k, we get (by Liebnitz's rule) 
au ac· Le· CJk = CJk (v - c' - k)f(c') - 0 f(c)dc. (4) 
Implicit differentiation then gives us that 
<Jc' CJGICJk (5) CJk CJGICJc' . 
Since CJGICJk = 1 and 
CJG {v [ {v ]2 
<Jc' = t (c - c'~c)dc I Jc. f(c)dc > 0, (6) 
we have that CJUICJk < 0. QED 
Proposition 3 shows that, for a fixed value of an agency, the politician pre-
fers those agencies with lower auditing cost. The argument behind this result is 
straightforward given the equilibrium behavior described in Proposition 2: as k 
increases more cost types are able to extract the maximum budget (i.e., they pool 
at b = v), thus depriving P of any positive net return. In addition, any budgets 
requested by cost types c < c' are larger, again shrinking P's return from the 
transaction. Hence, holding fixed the value of the agency, the politician prefers 
agencies with a lower auditing cost, since such agencies can extract only a neg-
ligible portion of the surplus, leaving the lion's share to the politician. This is 
illustrated in Figure 2 for k < k < k'. 
With regard to the value of the agency to the politician, v, we have that 
au = ac· (v - c· - k)f(c') + Lcftc)dc. 
av av 
(7) 
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In this case however the sign of iJc' liJv will depend on the prior fl.·); in particular, 
iJc' liJv ;;;::: 0 if and only if [f fl.c)dcr ;;;::: fl.v) f (v - c)fl.c)dc. (8) 
Thus, if equation (8) holds then iJU/iJv > 0. On the other hand, if iJc' liJv < 0, the 
sign of iJU/iJv will in general depend on the following trade-off: as v increases, 
fewer types separate; but for those that do, the return to Pis larger. Thus, if.f(c') 
is relatively large, then P may not prefer a marginal increase in v, since this 
would imply an unacceptably large fraction of cost types switching to the pooled 
budget request of b = v. Still, we can sign iJU/iJv for a range of parameters 
depending on the prior fl.·), since for any fl.·) there exists a value of the auditing 
cost kl such that if k ~ kl then iJU/iJv > 0. To see this, note that if k = 0 then c' 
= v, so that by equation (7) iJU/iJv > 0. Since c' is continuous ink, fork small 
the result follows, where clearly the definition of "small" depends on the prior 
fl..). 
The preceding analysis describes the preferences of our representative poli-
tician over a set of potential agencies, where an agency is parameterized by the 
pair (k, v). Given such a set, then, we can characterize the politician's optimal 
choice of agency. Let n ~ R ;_ denote the set of feasible agencies, and let (k*, 
v*) denote the optimal choice of agency in O; that is, if the politician were al-
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lowed to select but a single agency to form, his or her choice would be the agency 
characterized by the parameters (k*, v*). From the comparative statics results 
above, we know (k*, v*) is such that there does not exist (k, v) E n where k < 
k* and v = v*. Thus, the optimal agency will be such that no other agency exists 
that generates the same value while possessing a lower cost of auditing. Further, 
if equation (8) holds or if k* ~ kl, then there will exist no (k, v) such that k = k* 
and v > v*; no other agency exists that possesses the same auditing cost while 
generating a higher value. 
One of the interesting implications of the optimal choice of agency by the 
politician concerns the ex ante probability that an audit occurs, where we denote 
this by 7T(k, v). Fork< k' this is (from Proposition 2) 
7T(k, v) = r (1 - exp{ - clk})j(c)dc (9) 
+ (1 - exp{ - c' lk}kl(v - c')] f f(c)dc. 
Holding c' fixed, we see that both of these terms are decreasing ink, so that for 
cost types c * c' ask increases the probability of an audit decreases. However, 
since ac' liJk < 0, some cost types are switching from separating at b = c + k to 
pooling at b = v, where the latter is audited more often. Hence, the sign of d7TI 
ak will in general depend on the prior; a similar conclusion holds for iJ7T/iJv. 
Consider the following restriction on the prior/(·): 
f f(c)dc ~ f(c')(v - c'), (10) 
a condition that is satisfied if, for example, f(c') is not too large or/(·) is nonde-
creasing on (v - c', v). Banks (1989) shows that if equation (10) is satisfied then 
d7T/iJk < 0. In addition, if equation (8) holds as well, then d7T/iJv > 0. Now recall 
that the politician's preferences over the set of feasible agencies, n, imply mini-
mizing with respect to k and (for low k) maximizing with respect to v. Therefore, 
by the comparative statics results above, both of these directions lead to an in-
crease in the ex ante probability of an audit occurring. Hence, an implication of 
the politicians' optimal selection of an agency is to guarantee a relatively high 
amount of agency auditing. 
3. Interest Groups and Regulatory Agency Performance 
Thus far, we have left the variables k and v abstract without much discussion 
of their empirical referents. One way to think of these variables is as being de-
rived from a set of more fundamental variables and decisions related to agencies 
and interest groups. For the variable v, this concept is not novel; vis a function 
of both the benefits the agency generates for the relevant interest group constitu-
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ency as well as the ability of this group to translate those benefits into the elec-
toral rewards the politician covets. Our view is that the auditing cost k is similarly 
a function both of the technological considerations or gross costs of monitoring 
the agency as well as the ability of the relevant interest group to monitor the 
choices and performance of the agency and convey politically relevant informa-
tion to politicians. Such a concept parallels the notion of "fire alarms" in Mc-
cubbins and Schwartz (1984) and the related notion of a "constituency trigger" 
in Weingast (1984). According to this view, politicians cannot hope to monitor 
hundreds of agencies by themselves and, instead, rely on their constituents to do 
so. When something goes wrong, constituents pull a "fire alarm" that brings 
politicians to their aid. This in tum provides the incentives for agencies to satisfy 
the relevant constituencies, for those agencies that do not risk the wrath of polit-
ical intervention. Thus, politicians act through the threat of the "big club behind 
the door" that is triggered by their constituents (Weingast and Moran 1983). As 
this literature points out, the club need not be used frequently to be effective. 
Hence, the ability to assure the benefits of regulation are realized by constit-
uents, and the ability to subsidize auditing costs given a level of gross costs, can 
be seen as a function of the organization of the relevant interest groups. Thus, we 
can describe the politician-relevant variables k and v as v = v(b, x), and k = k(t, 
x), where the vector b summarizes the benefits to the constituency an agency 
generates, t represents the difficulty of monitoring the agency, and x measures the 
degree of cohesion in the interest groups. 7 Therefore, the general characteriza-
tion of an agency is by the vector (b, t, x). By design the effect of these variables 
on the politician-relevant variables k and v is as follows: 
1. avtab > 0, and aktat > 0, so that given a level of organization, the elec-
toral rewards to a politician increase in benefits and the auditing cost 
increases in difficulty; 
2. av/ax > 0, so that given a level of benefits the electoral rewards increase 
in interest group organization; 
3. aktax < 0, so that given a degree of auditing difficulty the politician's 
auditing cost decreases in interest group organization. 
As we have pointed out, most scholars who link interests groups and regu-
lation have focused on v, the value of the decision to the politicians generated, in 
our model, via the electoral rewards provided by the interest group. Our model 
yields the comparative statics result for some values of the parameters, namely, 
autav > O; that is, the larger the electoral rewards, the more attractive is the 
agency to the politicians, a result that parallels that found in Stigler (1971) and 
'More realistically, x might represent a vector of parameters that characterize an interest group 
and its environment by politically relevant components. It should be obvious how to generalize the 
discussion that follows in a natural way. 
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Peltzman (1976). In addition, the above discussion generates a further conclu-
sion: ceteris paribus (i.e., fixed k and b), the more organized an interest group is 
the more likely it is to receive beneficial regulation. 
Absent from most discussions, however, is a second critical variable, 
namely, the auditing cost faced by the politician. Given that the variable k is a 
function of the interest groups' degree of organization, the "ceteris paribus" as-
sumption above concerning k is untenable, since in essence this assumes that the 
variable t changes to offset the change in x. However, as noted above, iJkliJx < 0, 
so that since iJU/iJk < 0, the effect of an increase in organization through the 
auditing cost is beneficial to the politician as well. Thus, the model highlights the 
twin (and complementary) effects of an organized interest group: ceteris paribus 
(i.e., fixed b and t), organized groups are better able to translate the benefits 
generated by the agency into electoral rewards for the politician; further, be-
cause they can more effectively monitor the agency's performance, they allow a 
larger proportion of those rewards to accrue to the politician. 
Another implication of disentangling the politician-relevant variables (k, v) 
into their more primitive elements (b, t, x) is to explain the existence of certain 
agencies that might otherwise not be justified. Consider for example the Con-
sumer Products Safety Commission, an agency that attempts to service a large 
set of"consumers," but whose associated interest group (the aforementioned con-
sumerists) is relatively diffuse. Traditional analysis seems to predict that such an 
agency could not be sustained, given the inability of the interest group to gener-
ate electoral rewards for the relevant politicians. However, the current model 
posits the existence of a second source of an interest group's influence with re-
spect to a politician, namely, through the interest group's ability to monitor the 
agency's performance. If the technology inherent in monitoring an agency, cap-
tured by the variable t, is such that a diffuse interest group (or, possibly, an orga-
nized subset of the group) can still generate a sufficiently low auditing cost for 
the politician, then such an agency is more likely to be sustained. Hence, a rela-
tively disorganized interest group (e.g., the public at large) will receive the ben-
efits of regulation (e.g., the CPSC) when its ability effectively to monitor the 
agency offsets its inability to translate those benefits into electoral rewards. 
Alternatively, the model also suggests that an agency generating high levels 
of benefits and a well-organized interest group to translate such benefits into 
electoral rewards are not sufficient to guarantee the maintenance of such an 
agency. If technological considerations are such that regardless of the degree of 
cohesion in the group the politician's auditing cost k remains high, then such an 
agency will not persist, since most of the electoral rewards will go to the agency 
itself, in the form of an inflated budget, rather than the constituents and the poli-
tician. 
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4. Conclusion 
To understand the performance of regulatory agencies, we must begin with 
the politicians who create them. It is unlikely that politicians would again and 
again create bureaus that are able to extract the entire value of their services. 
Perhaps the creation of some agencies of this sort can be explained for symbolic 
reasons-their value is solely in their creation so that ex post problems might not 
matter. However, it is unlikely that the large bureaucracies of most Western gov-
ernments can be explained in this manner. 
If information asymmetries are potentially advantageous to agencies, then 
politicians either will look for ways to mitigate this problem or will not create the 
agencies in the first place. The key to understanding our model is that not all 
potential agencies have the same possibilities for exploiting their position. This 
suggests that those agencies that have a significant potential to extract rents from 
politicians will simply not be created. The agencies that are created, therefore, 
by and large will provide significant benefits to politicians (and their constitu-
ents) with only limited amounts captured for themselves. Put simply, this argu-
ment implies that there exists a strong selection effect at work in the process of 
agency creation: while bureaucratic discretion is a big problem for some potential 
agencies, politicians are far less likely to create such agencies. 
The model analyzed in this paper builds on several traditions in the literature 
on regulation: that of asymmetric information potentially exploitable by agen-
cies; that of focusing on politicians who seek ways to mitigate agency exploita-
tion; and that of focusing on the service of regulatory agencies to interest groups. 
What this paper provides is a unified approach to the study of these traditions. 
With regard to the service of interest groups, our model suggests that politicians 
find organized interest groups attractive for two reasons, not one: (l) because 
they provide electoral rewards and (2) because they monitor and help police 
agencies. Thus, even if there exists a diffuse constituency that provided the same 
electoral reward to politicians as an organized one, politicians would favor the 
latter because it provides the means for policing the delivery of benefits. 
Two implications follow from this. First, even if a diffuse group could pro-
vide sufficient electoral rewards for politicians to consider creating an agency, 
politicians may not do so because, ex post, they could not prevent the agency 
from exploiting its information position vis-a-vis the unorganized constituency. 
If politicians cannot prevent the agency from extracting all the rents of its ser-
vices, politicians will not create them. 
The second implication that follows from our approach concerns ineffi-
ciency. The standard source of efficiency loss in interest group models hinges on 
differential electoral rewards: because certain industries can organize support of 
cartelizing regulation in ways that their consumers cannot effectively oppose, 
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interest groups can lead to efficiency losses (cf. Stigler 1971; Peltzman 1976). 
Our model has little new to say about this source of inefficiency and, instead, 
identifies a second source. Namely, the main source of inefficiency in our model 
is not due to service to interest groups but rather from those agencies that are 
systematically not created because, ex post, there is no way to police them ade-
quately. 
Our approach has implications for fire alarm type oversight as well. The last 
result of section 2 showed that ask falls, the probability of auditing increases. At 
the same time, ask falls, the amount of a deviation between true costs, c, and the 
budget requested, ~(c), falls on average. In comparison with an agency asso-
ciated with a high cost of auditing, an agency with a low cost of auditing will 
exhibit more frequent audits and, hence, adjustments in budgets, but with the 
expected adjustment being smaller. This implies frequent communication be-
tween politicians and their constituents, resulting in frequent budget adjust-
ments. However, this does not necessarily mean more "oversight" in the sense of 
an explicit investigation by politicians into the nature of agency decisions. The 
main point of the above analysis is that "auditing" may take place through inves-
tigation by a constituency who then communicates the results to politicians rather 
than through a formal investigation by politicians. 
Another aspect of the politician-agency-interest group relationship is that 
even though it is politicians, not agencies, that choose which constituencies to 
benefit, we should observe little direct interaction between politicians and agen-
cies when the system works well. Policing agencies requires participation by 
both politicians and constituents, and it is typically the latter that interact with 
the agency on a regular basis. 
Finally, our view provides a new interpretation of the hypothesis prominent 
among political scientists and historians that we have labeled "cartel by design." 
According to this theory, agencies serve interest groups from inception, and 
doubtless there are many instances of this. According to our model, however, not 
all agencies that serve regulated interests do so by design. This view holds that 
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) only came to serve the regulated 
interests long after its inception. The ICC was instead originally designed to 
serve farmers and shippers. The latter, because they were diffuse groups, did not 
provide the constant monitoring and electoral rewards necessary to maintain the 
flow of agency benefits. As their political relevance declined (falling v and rising 
k) while that of the railroads did not, the latter came to dominate regulatory 
proceedings and hence "capture" the ICC. 8 In this way our interpretation poten-
'For a review of the literature on the ICC as well as a synthetic treatment that provides a new 
view, see Gilligan, Marshall, and Weingast (1989). This paper also argues that the two views noted 
in the current text are not inconsistent, but instead provide partial explanations that need to be com-
bined in the appropriate manner. 
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tially allows the use of comparative statics from the model to study changes in 
agency behavior over time. 
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